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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL CouRTS - SUBSTITUTION BY SUPREME COURT OF ITS INFERENCES OF FACT FOR THOSE
OF THE STATE CouRT - The recent cases of A very v. Alabama 1 and
Chambers v. Florida 2 raise the interesting question of the conclusiveness of a fact finding of a state court upon the United States Supreme
Court in a criminal trial when the accused claims that one of his constitutional rights has been impaired, and the holding of the state court
is to the effect that on the facts presented such right has not been
impaired. The case may arise in the United States Supreme Court in
either of two ways. It may come up on appeal from a lower federal
court denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in Moore v.
Dempsey.8 Or it may arise under a writ of certiorari to the state court.'
1 (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 3 2 I. Petitioner was arrested in Alabama and charged
with murder committed six years previously. He was arraigned on March 21, 1938,
two attorneys appointed to aid him, and his trial set for March 23. The case was
reached on March 24, at which time a motion for a continuance was filed on the
ground that petitioner's counsel had been involved in other cases and had not had
time to prepare the case. The motion was denied, the case was tried, and verdict of
guilty entered, all on the same day. Petitioner moved for a new trial on the ground
that the denial of his motion for continuance was a practical denial of the right to
counsel, and thus a deprivation of due process. The motion was denied, and on appeal
to the state supreme court the ruling was affirmed. Certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court, and the decree of the state court affirmed. The Court
stated that on the facts the petitioner had not been denied the benefit of counsel, thus
there had been no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
2 (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472. Petitioners, negroes, were arrested in Florida for
the murder of a white man. After their arrest they were moved from one jail to another numerous times due to the presence of a hostile populace. They were questioned
continuously for five days before the trial, and at the end of the fifth day the questioning was continued all night. Towards morning the petitioners finally "broke" and
confessions were obtained upon which the petitioners were convicted of the murder.
The trial court found that the confessions had not been illegally obtained, and the
state appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed. The Court stated that on the facts the confessions were illegally obtained,
and thus there was a denial of due process of law.
8 261 U. S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1922).
'Powell v.Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1933); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55
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Certiorari is the most common method, but even if habeas corpus is
used, the Supreme Court does not feel itself bound by res judicata,
this being stated in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion to Frank v.
Mangum."
The Supreme Court has not seemed inclined to state a basis for its
action in reaching a different conclusion upon a given state of facts
from that reached by the state court. The scope of this comment is to
attempt to determine: (I) the basis of federal interference with the
findings of fact of the state court; (2) which portion of that fact
picture interests the federal Court; ( 3) in what situations the federal
Court will review the findings of fact made by the state courts; and
(4) to what extent the federal Court will substitute its own inferences
of fact for those of the state court.
I.

The actual basis for interference by the federal courts in the findings of fact made by state courts in a criminal proceeding is the dissenting opinion of Justices Holmes and Hughes in Frank v. Mangum,6
and the majority opinion of Justice Hughes in Moore v. Dempsey.1
Both cases involved situations where it was claimed that the defendant
in a criminal trial in a state court was deprived of due process of law
because the court which tried him was intimidated by a mob. In the
Frank case the Supreme Court held that as the state appellate court,
sitting in an atmosphere wherein there was no mob interference, had
found that on the record there had been no mob domination of the trial
court, that decision was binding on the federal Court. The reasoning
was that it was a matter that was more fundamental than comity 8 that
required the federal courts to refrain from inquiring into the proceedings
S. Ct. 579 (1935); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1935);
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939); Avery v. Alabama, (U. S.
1940) 60 S. Ct. 321; Chambers v. Florida, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.
11 237 u. s. 309, 35 s. Ct. 582 (1914).
6 237 U.S. 309 at 345, 35 S. Ct. 582 (1914). See 28 HARV. L. REV. 793
(1915).
1 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 275 (1922). See 7 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1923). It is
interesting to note that certiorari was denied on October II, 1920, Hicks v. Arkansas,
254 U.S. 630, 41 S. Ct. 7 (1920), but that habeas corpus was later granted. See 33
YALE L. J. 82 (1923); 35 CoL. L. REv. 404 (1935); I UNiv. CHr. L. REV. 307
(1933).
8 "This is not a mere matter of comity, as seems to be supposed. The rule stands
upon a higher plane, for it arises out of the very nature and ground of the inquiry
into the proceedings of the state tribunals, and touches closely upon the relations between the state and Federal governments." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 at 329,
35 S. Ct. 582 (1914). See also: Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 at 252, 6 S. Ct.
734 (1886); Covell v. Heyman, III U.S. 176, 4 S. Ct. 355 (1884); In re Tyler,
149 U.S. 164, 13 S. Ct. 785 (1893).
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of the state court, and from substituting their judgment for that of the
state court when the fundamental rights of the defendant had not been
denied him; and that these rights had not been denied the defendant,
since the impartial review granted by the appellate court was a sufficient corrective process to correct any denial of due process by the
trial court. The dissenting opinion 9 in that case, and the majority
opinion in the Moore case indicate that the presence of a state corrective
procedure is not sufficient to prevent a review of the facts by the federal
Court if it feels tliat the trial was in reality just a mask, and if the state
corrective procedure has not given to the prisoner the benefit of the
federal right denied to him by the trial court. The Supreme Court
agrees that the corrective procedure may be so adequate as to prevent
federal interference. This concession seems to have been little more
than the payme,n.t of lip service to the decision in Frank v. Mangum,
because neither in the Moore case, nor in the subsequent cases involving this point, has the Court felt that the state corrective process has
been adequate. From this beginning has sprung the increased interference by the federal courts in the state criminal proceedings.10
2.

In all of the cases in this field in which the United States Supreme
Court has evinced an interest in the fact situation, this interest is not
upon the accepted and basic facts. Instead, the interest of the Court
is directed towards what may be called "inferences drawn from facts." 11
These inferences are the conclusions drawn from the operation of the
mind on accepted facts. Thus in the Moore case, the Supreme Court
accepted without argument the findings of fact made by the state
court as regards the presence of a mob at the trial, and the actuality of
their actions. However, the point of disagreement was as to the effect
the presence of the mob had on the trial court. The state appellate
court drew the inference from these facts that there had been no mob
domination at the ·trial. The Supreme Court drew the opposite inference and said that there was mob domination. The same situation is true
in most of the cases in this particular field. In Pierre v. Loitisiana,12
the Supreme Court accepted the finding of the state court as to the
method used to pick the jury, but felt that this method constituted
9

Cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct.
527 (1920), where Holmes, J., argued that the decision of an administrative tribunal
should be conclusive on the facts, and not open to review.
10 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct.
536 (1939); Chambers v. Florida, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.
11 Another term that might be used is "ultimate fact."
12
306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939).
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discrimination against negroes, whereas the state appellate court had
felt that it did not. And it was this view that was expressed in Chambers
v. Florida 18 where the findings of fact of the state court as to the
method used in obtaining confessions were accepted, but the conclusions of the state court as to whether this did or did not constitute torture was not followed. It is in this narrow field between questions of
basic fact and pure questions of law that the federal courts intervene:
and substitute for the inference of fact made by the state court, their
own inference of fact. And there is no invasion of the constitutional
right to a trial by jury in a criminal action 14 because trial by jury has
been granted.

3.
That the Supreme Court will review the findings of fact of the
state court, we are certain. In what situations this will be done is a
mystery. The only safe method of determining these situations seems
to be to wait until the particular case is decided by the Court. The
closest approach to a test to be applied is that st:;i.ted by Justices Holmes
and Hughes in the dissenting opinion to Frank v. Mangum 15 and
reiterated in the majority opinion by Justice Hughes in Norris v.
Alabama.16 This test is that whenever a question of fact is so intermingled with a question of constitutional right that the consideration
of one necessarily involves the consideration of the other, then the
federal Court will review the fact finding of the state court. The
borders of the doctrine of review viewed in the light of this test are
very hazy. Yet an attempt to find a more definite basis is quite fruitless. Despite Moore v. Dempsey, where the Court refused certiorari
but took the case on appeal from its own district court, there is no discrimination against a review direct from the state court on certiorari,
most of the later cases having come up in this fashion. 17 So that is no
test for determining the situations in which the Supreme Court will
review. The fact situations themselves offer no basis for discrimination,
the federal Court having taken cases wherein the complaint has to do
with the right to counsel,18 the right to accompany the jury to the
scene of the crime,1° obtaining confessions by torture,2° mob domina18

(U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.

u U. S. Constitution, art. 3, §

2.

237 U.S. 309 at 347, 35 S. Ct. 582 (1914).
16 294 U. S. 587 at 590, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935).
17 See cases cited in note 4, supra.
18 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932); Avery v. Alabama,
(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 321.
19 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1933).
20 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1935); Chambers v.
Florida, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.
15

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

tion,21 and discrimination because of race. 22 The one point that all of
these cases have in common is that they all deal with rights asserted
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. But
this serves as no basis for determining which cases the federal Court
will review, inasmuch as it is practically the only ground that may be
used by a defendant in a criminal action to have his case brought into
a federal court. It is clear that in rape cases 23 and murder cases 24 the
federal court has reviewed the case. Thus perhaps it is the severity of
the punishment to be imposed on the defendant-the extent to which
he will be deprived of his life or liberty, allegedly without due process
of law-that determines the question whether or not the Supreme
Court will make a review of the facts. 25 Perhaps the only possible and
workable test is the one that puts the situation on a basis of a Gordian
knot composed of questions of fact and questions of law. Certainly
this is advantageous to the Court in that it is given a wide latitude for
accepting or rejecting a case.

4.
To attempt to predict the extent to which the Supreme Court will
substitute its inferences of fact for those of the state court i-s little more
than pure conjecture. In A very v. Alabama 26 the federal Court accepted
the inference of the state court to the effect that the denial of a motion
for continuance made by defense counsel to give them added time in
which to prepare the case was not a denial of the right to have the
benefit of counsel. Thus it would seem that as regards a matter of
procedure, or the discretion of the trial judge, the federal Court will
not substitute its inference for that of the state court. However, the
pertinent question at this point is, ..,ill the fact that it is a matter of
discretion prevent the federal Court from interfering if counsel is given ·
only one day, or two .gours, or one hour in which to prepare his case,
21 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S."Ct. 582 (1914); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1922).
22 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939).
23 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932).
24 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1922); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1933); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56
S. Ct. 461 (1935); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939);
Chambers v. Florida, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.
25 This theory would seem to be supported by the concurring opinion of Brandeis,
J., in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 at 77, 56 S. Ct. 720
(1936), where it is said, "A citizen who claims that his liberty is being infringed is
entitled, upon habeas corpus to the opportunity of a judicial determination of the facts .
. • . But a multitude of decisions tells us that when dealing with property a much more
liberal rule applies."
26 (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 321.
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rather than three days? It would seem that if such were the case, the
inference of the federal Court as to whether the right to counsel had
been denied might well have been different. In Pierre v. Louisiana,21
Justice Black said, "In our consideration of the facts the conclusions
reached by the [state] Supreme Court .•• are entitled to great respect."
Yet this respect did not prevent the federal Court from disregarding
those conclusions. Nor did it prevent the Court, speaking through
Justice Black in Chambers v. Florida, 28 from saying that confessions
had been obtained illegally, thus overturning the inference drawn by
both the state appellate court and the jury in the state trial court. The
Court has disregarded the inference of the state court where it clearly
appears that the right to counsel has been denied,2 g that persons have
been excluded from a jury because of race,so or that confessions have
been obtained by torture,81 indicating that the Court is more willing
to interfere where the matter is so flagrant as to shock its collective
conscience, than to interfere when it is merely a matter of procedure
or discretion, like granting a continuance. But it would seem that due
process of law is not any the more denied in these flagrant cases than
it is through the use of the unbridled discretion of a trial judge in
denying a motion of continuance, if such a denial in fact does preclude
the possibility of preparing a case for trial. Perhaps a distinction will
not be drawn on such a basis as this. Perhaps the only guide to the action
of the Court is that it will interfere when it feels that the defendant
is not being dealt with in a fair manner by the state courts. To leave
this question with such an unsatisfactory answer creates a sense of
incompleteness that is disturbing. Yet at the present writing, nothing
more definite can be offered.
Whether this trend of the federal courts to extend their surveillance
over state criminal procedure is considered favorably or not depends
upon one's particular viewpoint. There is little doubt but that it is an
opening wedge in the direction of a greater subduing of state's rights in
favor of national rights. Yet on the other hand, it is a step toward a
guarantee of greater safety to a defendant who finds that his trial is
being conducted in such a hotbed of adverse prejudice that his possibilities of a fair trial are negligible, whether he be guilty or innocent.
John S. Pennell
306 U. S. 354 at 358, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939).
(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 472.
29 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932).
80 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939).
81 Chambers v. Florida, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 4 72.
21

28

